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 INTRODUCTION 
In her twenty plus years on the United States Supreme Court, Justice Ruth 
Bader Ginsburg has issued momentous decisions and significant dissents 
concerning constitutional guarantees of equality. She is best known for her 
leadership—as an advocate, scholar, judge, and justice—on issues of gender 
discrimination.1 Although one might expect related commitments to civil liberties 
to shape cases concerning the criminal justice process, Justice Ginsburg’s mark on 
constitutional criminal procedure appears comparatively faint. Her contributions 
have been subtle,2 and her cautious opinions at first seem disconnected from the 
clear principles established in the discrimination cases.3   
Yet when Justice Ginsburg’s criminal procedure decisions are considered 
through the lens of her broader jurisprudence on equality, some common 
commitments emerge. The argument for “equal citizenship stature”4 relates to her 
efforts to remove the systematic barriers to entry that preclude access to the courts 
in criminal cases. Here too she seeks to protect the dignity of defendants facing 
official power. And through careful engagement with the facts of each case and a 
consistent focus on the prerequisites to fair adjudication, she has highlighted the 
due process obligations of prosecutors, demanded adequate representation of 
defendants, expanded the right to confront witnesses, and increased the jury’s 
control over sentencing determinations.  
This chapter reconsiders Justice Ginsburg’s understated but important 
criminal procedure legacy. Notably, a comprehensive bibliography documenting 
her own prolific writings, together with the academic commentary and assorted 
tributes published through her first ten years on the Court, lists hundreds of 
publications, but not a single one concerning criminal procedure.5 Part I assesses 
the perception of Justice Ginsburg’s muted voice in the field. It describes her role 
in protecting existing trial rights from encroachment and articulating new 
requirements of procedural equality, and also characterizes those cases as 
consonant with her incremental approach. Justice Ginsburg’s contributions have 
received little attention in part because her disposition to caution often produces 
outcomes that appear to favor the government, at least in the short term. Her 
opinion for the Court in Perry v. New Hampshire,6 for example, surprised some 
observers by rejecting any special reliability screening for suggestive eyewitness 
identifications,7 and Part I concludes with a discussion of that case.   
When Justice Ginsburg writes from an internal perspective on the courts, 
however, and shifts her focus from reliability to opportunity, the volume of her 
voice increases. Part II describes Justice Ginsburg’s efforts to ensure meaningful 
access to the criminal courts. Her opinions appear most animated when they 
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concern an aspect of the criminal justice process that reinforces inequality. And 
that concern may have found its fullest expression in a civil case: Connick v. 
Thompson.8 In Connick, Justice Ginsburg issued a fierce dissent from the Court’s 
decision to vacate a damages award in favor of a defendant who was wrongfully 
convicted after prosecutors suppressed exculpatory evidence.9  
Part III connects Justice Ginsburg’s advocacy for meaningful access to the 
criminal courts to her dedication to fair treatment in other realms. Intellectual 
history and personal experience complicate any justice’s jurisprudence, and it can 
be difficult to trace beliefs in one area to decisions in another. Legacies are not 
always linear, but this chapter suggests that Justice Ginsburg’s legacy is more 
integrated than previously thought. There is an unexplored connection between 
her perception of the role of the courts in remedying unfairness in the 
discrimination cases and in lowering barriers to entry in the criminal justice 
process.   
 
I. INCREMENTAL PROTECTIONS AND RESTRAINED DECISIONS 
Justice Ginsburg’s criminal procedure jurisprudence appears mild because 
she has acted primarily to preserve existing liberties rather than to expand 
constitutional protections. By and large, she seems less active on behalf of 
criminal defendants than “one might expect from a Justice appointed by a 
Democratic president and hailing from the ACLU.”10 This perception is in 
keeping with “progressive criticism of Justice Ginsburg as an excessively cautious 
jurist.”11 And some commentators report the defense bar’s assessment that her 
“support of defense-oriented positions is somewhat lacking in intensity” and thus 
has not had a significant impact.12 Though she has in fact voted more frequently 
to protect defendants than most of her colleagues on the Rehnquist and Roberts 
Courts, Justice Ginsburg’s record does not appear to favor defendants as much as 
the decisions of progressive icons such as Justices Brennan and Marshall did.13    
This is so in part because Justice Ginsburg’s intellectual instincts on the 
Court, as with her earlier litigation strategies, have been incremental across 
substantive areas of the law. As an advocate, she challenged classifications based 
on gender discrimination one at a time rather than attempting to prevail on a new 
constitutional theory aimed at broad social change. Often celebrated for these 
measured steps in the direction of what were ultimately historic advances in 
gender equality, Justice Ginsburg has repeatedly cited slow but steady forward 
motion as her preferred speed on the bench as well.14 Indeed, she has self-
identified as given to interstitial action, an approach that she believes “affords the 
most responsible room for creative, important judicial contributions.”15 She favors 
narrow rules, adheres closely to established precedents, and generally avoids 
grand pronouncements.16 Her conception of the judicial role, as she stated in her 
confirmation hearings, is to “get it right and keep it tight.”17 This layered, gradual, 
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common-law approach to social progress extends to abortion rights, and Justice 
Ginsburg has famously expressed concern that the landmark Roe v. Wade18 
decision was an ill-timed sudden move that “ventured too far.”19   
Pragmatism characterizes many of Justice Ginsburg’s criminal procedure 
decisions as well. She has employed her incremental approach not only to slowly 
advance social change but also to defend the remnants of Warren Court 
precedents. The Warren Court extended the right to counsel to indigent 
defendants charged with felonies, required that suspects undergoing custodial 
interrogation be advised of their right to remain silent and consult an attorney, and 
applied the exclusionary rule to state-court suppression of evidence seized in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment.20 Justice Ginsburg has served on the Court 
during an era of erosion in those and other criminal procedure rights. Although 
approximately half of her decisions could be categorized as favoring the 
government, she often carefully constructs a narrow majority ruling, drafts a 
concurrence that mitigates the impact of the decision, or dissents to lay down a 
marker against future encroachment.21 As Christopher Slobogin has observed, 
“rather than lambasting the majority for its blindness or illogic in broad and far-
reaching language, [her] concurrences pay close attention to precedent and rely on 
precise ‘lawyerly’ analysis detailing how narrow the majority ruling is, or could 
be construed to be.”22 
In relation to other areas of the law, Justice Ginsburg has garnered few 
marquee opinion assignments concerning criminal procedure. Some of the 
majority opinions that she has authored fit within this narrow, cautious genre. One 
closely-followed decision, Perry v. New Hampshire,23 concerned eyewitness 
identifications. Members of the defense community hoped the Court would 
address growing skepticism of eyewitness testimony, which is often persuasive 
evidence against criminal defendants, but flawed in terms of reliability. The 
Court, however, concluded that a fair opportunity for the defense to raise the 
soundness of an identification before a jury was sufficient to assure due process, 
even if the identification was made under suggestive circumstances.24   
The witness in the Perry case had called the police to report seeing an 
African American man allegedly breaking into cars in the parking lot of her 
apartment complex. When the police arrived and questioned the witness in her 
apartment, the witness pointed out her kitchen window at a suspect, Barion Perry, 
standing in the parking lot. A month later, however, the witness could not identify 
Perry in a photo array. And at the time of the initial identification, Perry was 
standing next to a police officer in the still-dark parking lot, and was the only 
African American person there. Perry was charged with theft by unauthorized 
taking and criminal mischief, and he moved to suppress the parking lot 
identification on the ground that admission of a suggestive one-person show-up 
would violate due process. The New Hampshire trial court denied the motion and 
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admitted the identification. Perry was convicted of theft and appealed through the 
state courts to the Supreme Court.   
The Supreme Court affirmed. Due process concerns, it reasoned, arise 
only when law-enforcement officers introduce the suggestive element themselves, 
and the improper police conduct creates a “substantial likelihood of 
misidentification.”25 In reaching that decision, Justice Ginsburg frustrated some 
observers by disregarding the mounting social science evidence calling the 
reliability of eyewitness identifications into question.26 She reasoned, however, 
that the Constitution protected the defendant not by excluding the evidence but by 
affording an opportunity to persuade the jury that it is not credible.   
Perry exemplifies Justice Ginsburg’s emphasis on in-court process over 
on-the-street policing. She generally views law enforcement from a practical 
perspective, and she has imposed few new constraints on investigative practices. 
Justice Sotomayor presents something of a contrast, with notable decisions 
advancing a more expansive and technologically savvy understanding of privacy 
under the Fourth Amendment,27 objecting to the narrowing scope of Fifth 
Amendment Miranda protections in custodial interrogations,28 and dissenting 
from the Court’s due process analysis in Perry itself.29  
Justice Ginsburg’s Perry opinion also reveals the way in which she 
privileges the context of the adversarial process over content-based exclusions. It 
is in keeping, for example, with her alliance with Justice Scalia to establish a 
reinvigorated Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses, no longer tethered to 
the reliability of the hearsay statement a witness made.30 “The potential 
unreliability of a type of evidence,” she wrote in Perry, “does not alone render its 
introduction at the defendant’s trial fundamentally unfair.”31 Justice Ginsburg 
further deferred to state and lower federal courts on the question whether evidence 
is sufficiently reliable to be admitted.  
Where Justice Ginsburg does act to strengthen protections against law 
enforcement intrusion, it is often because she perceives a need to discourage 
misconduct. In Perry, for example, she noted the limited deterrence value of a 
contrary ruling, concluding that it would be difficult to dissuade law enforcement 
from engineering identifications through a case where only external facts and 
circumstances gave rise to the suggestiveness.32 In other cases, however, she has 
resisted unfair manipulation of investigations, and objected to governmental end-
runs around the rules.  
For example, Justice Ginsburg has often advocated rules designed to 
prevent law enforcement from gaming encounters with suspects. As she 
acknowledged in Perry, police misconduct represents a systematic failure that 
raises a due process problem and may require an exclusionary remedy. In a recent 
Fourth Amendment case, Kentucky v. King,33 she dissented to underscore the 
dangers of police-created exigencies.34 Likewise, she has been vigilant about 
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police manipulation when it comes to the requirement of Miranda warnings, 
favoring a broad definition of “custody.”35 In addition, she has insisted that 
something more than an anonymous tip is required before an officer can claim 
reasonable suspicion for a stop,36 and she recently expressed concern that police 
may dodge the warrant requirement by removing a party who refuses to consent 
to a search from the premises.37 She has also opposed efforts to “constrict the 
domain of the exclusionary rule” to deterrence, fearing that would create perverse 
incentives for law enforcement to neglect the electronic databases that “form the 
nervous system of contemporary criminal justice operations.”38 
 Overall, however, Justice Ginsburg proceeds from the premise that what 
happens in court matters more than how defendants got there. Her opinions 
suggest that individuals can best confront the power of the state from within the 
criminal justice process. And where the right to be heard has been vindicated,39 
then the adversarial system adequately protects equality and fairness. Perry helps 
to illuminate where her commitments lie. The core of her reasoning in Perry is 
that the trial process—including the right to counsel, the right to cross examine 
witnesses, the rules of evidence, expert testimony, carefully crafted jury 
instructions, and the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt—suffices to 
caution juries against placing undue weight on flawed eyewitness testimony.40   
 
II. OPPORTUNITY JURISPRUDENCE AND AN INTERNAL PERSPECTIVE ON THE COURTS 
Justice Ginsburg’s contributions to criminal procedure stem primarily 
from her attention to the power of individual defendants within the trial process 
rather than constraints on the power of the state. Where she perceives a fair 
playing field, Justice Ginsburg has often authored or joined pro-government 
decisions.41 It is true that those decisions exist in some tension with her 
progressive instincts in other contexts.42 But adjudicative criminal procedure often 
upends expectations in this way because it can create unusual affinities. For 
example, although Justice Ginsburg and Justice Sotomayor vote together often, 
they diverge in many criminal procedure cases. Justice Sotomayor’s focus on 
expanding constitutional rights can put her at odds with Justice Ginsburg’s trial-
process approach. In contrast, Justice Ginsburg’s vigilance about procedural 
safeguards has led her to support a less-frequent ally, Justice Scalia, in his 
decisions redefining the Confrontation Clause and expanding the domain of the 
jury.43  
Moreover, Justice Ginsburg shares with some of her colleagues an internal 
perspective and a commitment to ensuring fairness within the existing system of 
criminal adjudication rather than changing its parameters. Even on a Court 
composed almost entirely of former appellate judges,44 Justice Ginsburg stands 
out as a “lawyer’s lawyer” and “judge’s judge.”45 Whether appellate judges bring 
common temperaments and techniques to the docket is an open question. When 
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William Rehnquist joined the Court in 1972, former federal judges were in the 
minority, and earlier Courts had members with substantially more experience as 
governors, legislators, and cabinet members.46 Empirical studies have questioned 
Chief Justice Roberts’s contention that appellate judges on the Court are more 
likely to follow precedent and set aside policy preferences.47 But he has recently 
made more nuanced statements about the justices’ shared internal perspective on 
the Court’s place in the American political process. In a 2013 appearance before 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, Chief Justice Roberts 
acknowledged that some of the questions before the Court might benefit from a 
broader view of public policy but could only be evaluated by the current Court 
through a “focused way of drilling in on the law.”48    
A hallmark of Justice Ginsburg’s jurisprudence is that she is indeed adept 
at “drilling in on the law,” and even more so at closely reading the factual 
record.49 A meticulous review of the details of a case and the procedural 
complexities comports with her deliberate approach. But even through that 
lawyerly lens, Justice Ginsburg has a long view. She fully understands how 
litigation relates to policy and how to patiently pursue a principle through 
individual cases that are sometimes many years apart. She is not only one of the 
most seasoned litigators on the current Court but also the Court’s most significant 
social movement advocate at present. She has firsthand experience of the eventual 
interplay between judicial decisionmaking and increased opportunity.50  
Accordingly, over time, her constitutional criminal procedure decisions 
have helped to balance the government’s power in the trial process. Even where 
she has not actively expanded defendant’s rights, she has identified the “practical 
obstacles” to protecting those rights and has advocated the removal of those 
barriers.51 She has, for example, rejected executive branch attempts to shift 
prosecutions arising from the war on terror away from the purview of the federal 
courts.52 And she has guarded the right to be heard and mount a defense,53 and the 
opportunity to cross examine witnesses and present facts to a jury.54 
Perhaps Justice Ginsburg’s primary concern in criminal cases has been 
ensuring that neither lack of means nor limited procedural prowess shuts 
defendants out of court. She has been particularly dedicated to preserving the 
right to counsel.55 In Alabama v. Shelton,56 she extended the right to counsel to 
proceedings where the defendant receives a suspended sentence.57 Defendants 
who decide to appeal from a guilty plea also require counsel, as she argued in 
Halbert v. Michigan.58 The state should never, she wrote, “bolt the door to equal 
justice” when indigent defendants seek appellate review of criminal convictions.59 
Nor should defendants be left without counsel when confronted with the 
complexities of the adversarial system. Ever practical, Justice Ginsburg has noted 
that 68 percent of the prison population did not complete high school and may 
lack basic literacy skills, and that alone can bar entry to the courts.60 She also has 
written separately to underscore that procedural requirements are “a tall order for 
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a defendant of marginal literacy,”61 to express concern about uncounseled 
convictions for driving under the influence,62 and to suggest that judges are 
obligated to warn pro se litigants about the consequences of their legal 
decisions.63   
The right-to-counsel cases fundamentally implicate Justice Ginsburg’s 
commitment to fair access, and she views the function of public defenders 
broadly. She recognizes that there are “systematic failures across the country in 
the provision of defense counsel services to the indigent.”64 To begin to address 
those problems, she has argued for “expanding the situations in which the right to 
counsel obtains” and “policing the implementation of the right.”65 In Maples v. 
Thomas,66 for example, she wrote a spare but searing description of the minimal 
resources and training supporting defense lawyers in capital cases in Alabama.67 
In that light, she found no procedural default when an attorney’s abandonment of 
a client resulted in a missed deadline, which would have arbitrarily denied the 
defendant his “day in court.”68 And in Vermont v. Brillon,69 she concluded that 
“delay resulting from a systematic breakdown in the public defender system” 
could be charged to the state.70 She has also stated that she has “yet to see a death 
case, among the dozens coming to the Supreme Court on eve-of-execution stay 
applications, in which the defendant was well represented at trial.”71 Because she 
entrusts defense lawyers with maintaining some balance in the adversarial 
process, Justice Ginsburg has also held counsel to a high standard.72 
Furthermore, a robust view of the jury’s role follows from Justice 
Ginsburg’s belief that safeguards in the adversarial trial best ensure fairness.73 She 
has dissented in death penalty cases to underscore the importance of clear 
instructions to juries on the choices they confront.74 And she allied herself with 
Justice Scalia in a series of decisions on jury determinations of sentencing facts. 
She voted with the majority in Apprendi v. New Jersey,75 which requires jury 
findings of aggravating factors that increase criminal sentences beyond statutory 
maximums.76 She later authored related opinions requiring that facts supporting a 
capital sentence be found by a jury,77 and prohibiting judges from making factual 
findings giving rise to higher potential sentences.78 In a 2005 sentencing case, 
United States v. Booker,79 Justice Ginsburg’s concern with mandatory sentencing 
guidelines encountered her resistance to abrupt systematic change.80 She was the 
only justice to join the majority opinions on both substance and remedy, first 
agreeing that the mandatory federal Sentencing Guidelines violated the jury trial 
guarantees of the Sixth Amendment, but then joining with four different 
colleagues to conclude that the appropriate remedy was to give judges the 
discretion to apply them. Despite the decisive impact of switching her vote, she 
did not write at all in the case. 
What may be the most telling criminal procedure opinion authored by 
Justice Ginsburg actually came in a civil case. Her dissent from the Court’s 
decision in Connick v. Thompson81 highlights the connection between fair play by 
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prosecutors and the right to be heard. It involves a defendant first denied access to 
exculpatory evidence necessary to his criminal trial and then stripped of the 
remedy he received in civil court for his related constitutional claim. 
The case arises from the wrongful conviction of John Thompson for 
robbery and murder. Thompson spent eighteen years in prison for those 
convictions, fourteen of them on death row in solitary confinement twenty-three 
hours a day.82 During his robbery trial, prosecutors withheld several pieces of 
exculpatory evidence, including a blood sample from the robbery crime scene 
establishing that the perpetrator’s blood type was B.83 Though prosecutors did not 
test Thompson’s blood (which is type O), neither did they disclose to the defense 
that the forensic evidence, and a lab report conclusively identifying the 
perpetrator’s blood type, existed. In fact, they took pains to conceal it by 
removing it from the property room during pretrial discovery. Prosecutors then 
used the robbery conviction to seek the death penalty in the subsequent murder 
trial, and to preclude Thompson from testifying in his own defense because of the 
impeachment effect of the prior conviction.  
A defense investigator came across a microfiche copy of the laboratory 
report in police archives just before Thompson’s sixth scheduled execution date in 
2003.84 The blood evidence ruled out Thompson’s involvement in the robbery, 
and the trial court vacated that conviction. Thompson was also granted a new trial 
on the murder charge because the prosecution’s “egregious” misconduct and 
intentional concealment of exculpatory evidence had prevented him from 
presenting a defense and testifying at trial. Upon retrial, Thompson was acquitted 
of the murder and released.  
Thompson then sued for the violation of his federal civil rights under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983. Pursuant to Brady v. Maryland,85 due process requires the 
government to disclose to the defense any evidence in its possession that is both 
favorable and material to the defendant’s guilt or punishment.86 Thompson 
alleged that the New Orleans District Attorney’s deliberate indifference to the 
need to train prosecutors on their constitutional obligations caused a constitutional 
violation. The central question was whether the harm to Thompson resulted from 
the District Attorney acting in his official capacity, or from the individual and 
independent violations of rogue prosecutors.87 A jury found the District 
Attorney’s Office liable and awarded Thompson $14 million in damages. The 
Fifth Circuit sustained the award, but in a 5-4 decision authored by Justice 
Thomas, the Supreme Court concluded that the District Attorney’s Office could 
not be held liable for a single incident of wrongdoing. 
In order to prevail, Thompson needed to demonstrate that the District 
Attorney was deliberately indifferent to the need to train his prosecutors about 
Brady’s command, and that the lack of training led to the Brady violation. An 
earlier case, Canton v. Harris,88 had established that deliberate indifference may 
be shown when a policymaker ignores a pattern of similar constitutional 
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violations by untrained employees.89 The Court in Thompson held, however, that 
the District Attorney was entitled to rely on prosecutors’ general professional 
training and ethical obligations. Although the case was the third before the 
Supreme Court concerning misconduct by the New Orleans District Attorney’s 
Office,90 the Court also concluded that Thompson failed to show the necessary 
pattern of deliberate indifference to the constitutional obligation.91   
Justice Ginsburg would have upheld the damages award in light of the 
“gross, deliberately indifferent, and long-continuing violation of [Thompson’s] 
fair trial right.”92 The case serves as a self-contained demonstration of both the 
importance of enforcing Brady requirements and the role of section 1983 liability 
in doing so. Accordingly, Justice Ginsburg let the facts speak for themselves and 
dedicated her dissent—joined by Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan—to a 
“lengthy excavation of the trial record.”93  
By exposing the root causes and net effects of pervasive noncompliance 
with Brady violations, she refuted the majority’s conclusions that only a single 
violation occurred, and that the District Attorney was anything but deliberately 
indifferent to it: 
From the top down, the evidence showed, members of the District 
Attorney’s Office, including the District Attorney himself, misperceived 
Brady’s compass and therefore inadequately attended to their disclosure 
obligations. Throughout the pretrial and trial proceedings against 
Thompson, the team of four engaged in prosecuting him for armed 
robbery and murder hid from the defense and the court exculpatory 
information Thompson requested and had a constitutional right to 
receive. The prosecutors did so despite multiple opportunities, spanning 
nearly two decades, to set the record straight. Based on the prosecutor’s 
conduct relating to Thompson’s trials, a fact trier could reasonably 
conclude that inattention to Brady was standard operating procedure at 
the District Attorney’s Office.94 
Although the evidence at issue was one crime lab report regarding blood-type 
evidence, several prosecutors over many years engaged in various acts to suppress 
it. The only thing isolated or unitary about the constitutional violation was “the 
sense that it culminated in the wrongful conviction and near execution of only a 
single man.”95 Moreover, the District Attorney’s cavalier attitude toward training 
was not just “deliberate” but “flagrant.”96 When the supervisor had long ago 
“stopped reading law books,” and the office had never disciplined a single 
prosecutor despite “one of the worst records” in the country concerning Brady 
violations, then breaches were not just predictable but inevitable. According to 
Justice Ginsburg, “the Brady violations in Thompson’s prosecutions were not 
singular and they were not aberrational. They were just what one would expect 
given the attitude toward Brady pervasive in the District Attorney’s Office.”97 To 
conclude that a “culture of inattention” does not constitute disregard for “a known 
or obvious consequence” simply ignores the facts.98   
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Justice Ginsburg’s dissent is an effort to bring those facts to light, not only 
to expose the injustice to Thompson but also to explain the broader hindrance to 
enforcement that the Court’s decision created. Lax training and monitoring allow, 
or even encourage, prosecutors to ignore a right “fundamental to a fair trial.”99 
Because “explicitly illegal policies are rarely put in place,” insisting that “liability 
flows only from an explicit policy essentially immunizes policymakers who 
simply adopt a facially constitutional policy, or institute no policy at all, and then 
fail to prevent or implicitly condone unconstitutional conduct.”100 And 
prosecutorial concealment “is bound to be repeated unless municipal agencies 
bear responsibility—made tangible by § 1983 liability.”101   
The intensity with which Justice Ginsburg writes in Connick emphasizes 
her faith in the rigor of the adversarial system, and her view that it can only 
function if defendants have full and fair access to court. For Justice Ginsburg, 
Brady “is among the most basic safeguards brigading a criminal defendant’s fair 
trial right,” and a Brady violation “by its nature, causes suppression of evidence 
beyond the defendant’s capacity to ferret out.”102 Because the absence of the 
withheld evidence may result in the conviction of an innocent defendant, “it is 
unconscionable not to impose reasonable controls impelling prosecutors to bring 
the information to light.”103 If a defendant does not know of a defense he might 
raise, then he has not been “let in” to court in the way that Justice Ginsburg 
envisions. Common sense dictates that defendants should not be compelled to 
“scavenge for hints of undisclosed Brady material when the prosecution 
represents that all such material has been disclosed.”104 Moreover, narrowing 
definitions of prerequisites like “indifference” unduly restrict liability, and again 
deprive the defendant of legal recourse. Arising together, those issues yielded 
Justice Ginsburg’s most forceful piece of writing surrounding a question of 
criminal procedure.  
 
III. COMMON COMMITMENTS AND UNEXPLORED CONNECTIONS 
There is an unrecognized connection between remedying unfairness to 
individual defendants and Justice Ginsburg’s resistance to “built-in headwinds” 
that have discriminatory effect.105 At several points, links appear between the 
right to participate and be heard in the criminal justice process and her legacy on 
equality. Indeed, an opinion emphasizing prosecutors’ duty to give defendants a 
fair opportunity to present a defense fits within Justice Ginsburg’s small but 
significant collection of impassioned dissents.  
Justice Ginsburg has stated that she writes separate opinions only where 
she believes them to be “really necessary.”106 She carefully “[c]hooses her 
ground” when dissenting,107 and thus the decision to write at all is noteworthy. 
And Connick belongs in the even more select group of dissents so expressive of 
Justice Ginsburg’s core constitutional concerns that she read from the bench to 
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underline the objection to the majority’s decision. An oral dissent, she has 
explained, indicates “more than ordinary disagreement.”108 Most often she does 
not “announce,” but when she wants to “emphasize that the court not only got it 
wrong, but egregiously so,” reading a dissent can serve an “immediate 
objective.”109 It signals that the dissenter views the majority as “importantly and 
grievously misguided.”110   
Ledbetter v. Goodyear,111 in which Justice Ginsburg delivered perhaps her 
best known dissent from the bench, sounds some of the same notes as her Connick 
opinion. The majority decision in Ledbetter, authored by Justice Alito, held that a 
woman had waited too long to sue for pay discrimination even though she was 
unaware for years that she was earning substantially less than her male coworkers 
at a tire plant. Justice Ginsburg emphasized that private sector employees do not 
ordinarily know what their colleagues are making:    
Pay disparities often occur, as they did in Ledbetter’s case, in small 
increments; cause to suspect that discrimination is at work develops only 
over time. Comparative pay information, moreover, is often hidden from 
the employee’s view. Employers may keep under wraps the pay 
differentials maintained among supervisors, no less the reasons for those 
differentials. Small initial discrepancies may not be seen as meet for a 
federal case, particularly when the employee, trying to succeed in a 
nontraditional environment, is averse to making waves.112   
Because employees cannot “comprehend [their] plight,” neither can they 
complain until the disparity becomes apparent. And as a result of the Court’s 
decision, an employee’s “initial readiness to give [the] employer the benefit of the 
doubt” would preclude a later challenge.113     
What struck Justice Ginsburg about Connick relates to her central 
objection in Ledbetter. There, the plaintiff first suffered exclusion from full and 
fair participation in the workplace, and then was barred from court when she 
sought a remedy for that harm. Ledbetter did not know that she was paid less than 
her male counterparts until time extinguished her claim. Thompson’s dilemma is 
substantively distinct but structurally similar. Thompson was unaware of 
exculpatory evidence that could exonerate him while he spent eighteen years in 
prison on a wrongful conviction. Then, though there was no question that he 
suffered a deprivation of his constitutional rights, the Court constructed a 
procedural impediment that precluded prosecutorial liability. Justice Ginsburg 
also understood and expressed in both cases how foreclosing a remedy would 
affect future employees seeking equal pay, or future defendants exposed to similar 
unfairness.114   
Congress subsequently passed the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, 
accepting an invitation that Justice Ginsburg extended from the bench and 
adopting the position she took in dissent. It is too soon to say whether her Connick 
dissent might similarly inspire new standards on the Brady front, but at a 
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minimum the decision has generated substantial commentary about the need to 
reconsider the mechanisms through which Brady is enforced.115  
Justice Ginsburg’s oral dissents have gathered strength across substantive 
areas,116 and their broader strokes connect to her criminal procedure decisions. 
Recently, she has engaged in some negative incrementalism on both affirmative 
action and abortion rights.117 In Fisher v. University of Texas,118 she agreed that 
the University of Texas’s admissions plan should stay in place but objected to the 
decision to send it back for the lower court to judge it against a more demanding 
standard, expressing some concern about the majority’s strategy to diminish 
affirmative action over time.119 Moreover, in Gonzalez v. Carhart,120 she argued 
that treating women as incapable of making the difficult choices surrounding 
second-trimester abortions denied them equal protection.121 And she read her 
dissent aloud to emphasize what she called the majority’s “alarming” ruling and 
“effort to chip away” at abortion rights.122   
Furthermore, Justice Ginsburg continues to make her strongest arguments 
through a scrupulous understanding of the record and a common sense view of the 
facts.123 Her dissent in Vance v. Ball State University124 challenged a restrictive 
definition of “supervisor,” which in turn narrowed the conduct prohibited under 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.125 In Justice Ginsburg’s view, the 
majority’s definition of supervisor—limited to the person with the authority to 
hire, fire, demote, promote, transfer or discipline an employee126—exhibited 
“remarkable resistance” to “workplace realities” and would leave many 
employees defenseless against those in their chain of command who could make 
their work life miserable without having “tangible” authority.127 The following 
day, in Shelby County v. Holder,128 Justice Ginsburg read a dissent from the bench 
objecting that to conclude from the nation’s progress in protecting minority voters 
that the voting rights law was no longer needed was like “throwing away your 
umbrella in a rainstorm because you are not getting wet.”129 
Insisting on the realities—not only of workplaces and voting districts but 
of public defenders’ and prosecutors’ offices—has been a key feature of Justice 
Ginsburg’s dissents. Employees do not ordinarily inquire about the salaries of 
their counterparts,130 supervisory power is not confined to the individual who 
hires and fires,131 constitutional protections can achieve some gains and remain 
necessary at the same time.132 Nor do prosecutors suppress exculpatory evidence 
in coordination with several colleagues unless the office in which they work 
broadly tolerates circumvention of constitutional rights.133 The Connick Court 
simply ignored the basic realities of a functioning District Attorney’s Office to 
conclude that there was no deliberate indifference and that two decades of 
conduct involving many prosecutors constituted a single act.134 A defendant 
deprived of the essential facts necessary to his defense, and then precluded from 
seeking recourse for that violation in court, has twice been excluded from the 
system. And when the Court relies on these fictions to hinder judicial enforcement 
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of constitutional rights, Justice Ginsburg views that as yet another failure of 
process.  
There is thus an extent to which Justice Ginsburg’s criminal procedure 
decisions harmonize with the underlying commitment of her broader 
jurisprudence. She is dedicated, she has said, to “the idea of essential human 
dignity, that we are all people entitled to respect from our Government as persons 
of full human stature, and must not be treated as lesser creatures.”135 According to 
Neil Siegel, this belief in “equal citizenship stature”136 defines Justice Ginsburg’s 
vision for “how government power should be exercised and how individual rights 
should be protected in the American constitutional order.”137 Her criminal 
procedure opinions are neither entirely consistent with each other nor perfectly 
consonant with the discrimination decisions, but there is an intriguing and 
important relationship between them.  
Both sets of decisions, moreover, weave together fair process and equal 
access. In the gender discrimination cases, Justice Ginsburg has treated liberty 
and equality as interconnected values that “inform one another.”138 At times, she 
has used liberty arguments to protect equality,139 and in the criminal procedure 
realm, she has shown how equality concerns can safeguard liberty interests. In a 
majority opinion in M.L.B. v. S.L.J.,140 written early in her tenure on the Court, 
Justice Ginsburg recognized the relationship between equal protection and the 
illegitimacy of “fencing out would-be appellants based solely on their inability to 
pay core costs.”141 There, she held that indigent parents must be afforded an 
opportunity to appeal termination of parental rights whether or not they can pay 
for preparation of the trial record.142 The rationale in the opinion was self-
consciously imprecise because it comprehended more to the “essential fairness of 
the state-ordered proceedings anterior to adverse state action” than due process.143  
Justice Ginsburg also perceives some shortcomings to criminal procedure 
rights conceptualized as constraints and instead concentrates on the government’s 
affirmative obligations to ensure fair process.144 She recognizes, however, that 
fundamental liberty interests sometimes provide the strongest support for access 
to the courts.145 Consequently, neither the canonical gender discrimination 
decisions nor the quieter criminal procedure opinions can be described through 
“resort to easy slogans or pigeonhole analysis.”146 The two groups of cases, 
however, seem to coalesce around an ideal of opportunity, and an understanding 
of the importance of a fair playing field.147 
   
CONCLUSION 
Though they have received less attention than other areas of her 
jurisprudence, Justice Ginsburg’s criminal procedure opinions resonate with her 
work against discrimination. Her conception of a fair criminal justice process is 
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infused with equality principles, and particularly with the conviction that the 
government should not foster inequality, and should work to remedy the effects of 
past injustices. She has focused on expanding opportunity within adjudication, 
more than on ensuring reliability or enlarging privacy in the ways that her 
progressive predecessors did. Once criminal defendants have access—to the 
exculpatory information that might allow them to mount a defense, to the 
attorneys necessary to do so, and to a duly empowered jury—then she believes 
that the adversarial process safeguards constitutional rights. That commitment is 
an insufficiently appreciated dimension of Justice Ginsburg’s criminal procedure 
jurisprudence, and a connection that both informs and amplifies her other 
contributions.   
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